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PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES:
EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE CONCRETE




In Batson v. Kentucky' the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished procedures that allow a defendant in a criminal trial to chal-
lenge a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to prevent members
of a cognizable racial minority from serving on a petit jury.2 The de-
fendant may establish a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by satisfying a two-part test.
The defendant must show membership in a cognizable racial group
against whom the prosecutor exercised the discriminatory challenges
3
and that the facts and circumstances raise an inference that the prose-
cutor challenged the prospective jurors because of their race.4 The de-
fendant's prima facie showing constitutes what has come to be known
as a Batson motion, which shifts to the prosecutor the burden of justi-
fying the challenges on some nonracial grounds.5 In Edmonson v. Lees-
ville Concrete Co." the United States Supreme Court reversed a Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion and held that Batson's equal protec-
tion analysis applies to private litigants in civil trials.1 Prior to this
* B.A. 1986, Bob Jones University; J.D. 1991, University of South Carolina. The
author wishes to thank Professor William S. McAninch of the University of South Caro-
lina School of Law for his assistance in the preparation of this Note. The author also
wishes to thank Lee Ann Anderson for her assistance in the preparation of this Note.
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. Id. at 96-98.
3. Id. at 96. The Supreme Court recently modified this requirement in Powers v.
Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). A defendant may now establish a prima facie equal protec-
tion violation even if the defendant is not a member of the racial minority against whom
the prosecutor exercised the discriminatory challenges. Id. at 1373-74.
4. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
5. Id. at 97.
6. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
7. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, had held that Batson did not apply to pri-
vate litigants in civil trials. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); see also Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 897 F.2d
1346, 1347 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Edmonson for the proposition that Batson does not
1
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decision several other federal courts had addressed the applicability of
the Batson rule to civil trials. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Fludd v. Dykes8 and a panel of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.' held that
Batson applies to private litigants in civil trials. Several other federal
courts had acknowledged the issue without deciding it.10
Additionally, several state courts had addressed the issue. The
couits of last resort in New York" and Hawaii22 interpreted their state
constitutions to require private defense counsel in criminal trials to
justify their challenges on nondiscriminatory grounds. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court 3 and the Texas Court of Appeals 4 held that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require application of Batson to pri-
vate litigants in civil trials. However, the Supreme Court of Alabama
held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires application of Batson to
private litigants in civil trials.' 5
apply to a civil suit between solely private parties), vacated, 111 S. Ct: 2791 (1991).
8. 863 F.2d 822, 823 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); see also
Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 647-48 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that the expla-
nation for challenging jurors was not insufficient as a matter of law), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2263 (1991).
9. 919 F.2d 1281, 1282 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991).
10. Nowlin v. General Tel. Co., No. 87-1085 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 1989) (WL, CTA 4
database) ("We avoid addressing the question whether Batson might apply, and think
the court [below] did not err in deciding, under the Batson procedure, that defense
counsel had in any event offered sufficient non-discriminatory reasons for exercising the
peremptory challenges here in issue."); Robinson v. Quick, Nos. 88-3298, 88-3655 (6th
Cir. May 15, 1989) (WL, CTA 6 database) (holding that defendant failed to make out the
prima facie case required by Batson), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989); Jones v. Lewis,
874 F.2d 1125, 1129 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Assuming arguendo the correctness of appellant's
argument that Batson applies to civil actions, we conclude that Batson should not be
applied retroactively in this context."); Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir.
1988) ("[Whether] Batson does apply in all cases [is] a question we leave open; we ex-
press no view on that question . . . ."); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164-65 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that the party which objected to the challenges failed to establish a prima
facie case as required by Batson despite the court's "strong doubts about whether Bat-
son was intended to limit the use of peremptory strikes in civil cases"); Esposito v. Buo-
nome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that the party that objected to the
challenges failed to establish a prima facie case as required by Batson).
11. People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
12. State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990).
13. Chavous v. Brown, 396 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct., 2791, rev'd
per curiam, 409 S.E.2d 356 (S.C. 1991). The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed its
decision in Chavous in light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Edmonson.
409 S.E.2d at 356-57.
14. Powers v. Palacios, 794 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd per curiam,
813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991). The Texas Supreme Court reversed Powers in light of the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Edmonson. 813 S.W.2d at 490.
15. Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So. 2d 343 (Ala. 1989).
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2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss3/7
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
This Note considers the propriety of applying Batson to restrict
peremptory challenges in civil litigation. First, it briefly reviews the
history and purpose of peremptory challenges. It then outlines the his-
tory of modern limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges
and considers whether those limitations properly apply in civil litiga-
tion. This Note also considers whether the Edmonson Court's decision
to apply the equal protection limitation to civil litigation was correct
and the effect that decision has on private litigants' personal liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.16 Finally, it outlines current state court treat-
ment of peremptory challenges.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE
The use of peremptory challenges in criminal proceedings devel-
oped early in the English common law, although they were not availa-
ble in civil trials. William Blackstone described the peremptory chal-
lenge as "an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain
number of jurors, without shewing any cause at all."'1
Common-law courts originally allowed both the defendant and the
King's prosecutor to use peremptory challenges. By 1305 Parliament
had become displeased with the Crown's use of peremptory challenges,
however, and sought to end the practice by enacting the Ordinance for
Inquests.18 That statute explicitly stated that "if they that sue for the
King will challenge any of those Jurors, they shall assign of their Chal-
lenge a Cause certain."' 9
Despite this clear statutory prohibition, the common-law courts
continued to view the availability of peremptory challenges to both the
defendant and the King's prosecutor as essential. The courts developed
a practice that allowed the King's prosecutor to ask certain jurors to
stand aside without assigning any cause to the request.20 Only if a full
jury could not be assembled from the jury venire did the courts require
the prosecutor to assign a cause for excusing the juror.
2 1
The Ordinance for Inquests clearly expressed Parliament's desire
to restrict the prosecutor's use of challenges. Although the develop-
ment of the common law effectively circumvented the Ordinance for
Inquests, it did not alter a primary purpose of peremptory chal-
lenges-to provide the defendant with additional protection from the
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
17. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
18. An Ordinance for Inquests, 1305, 33 Edw. 4 (Eng.).
19. Id.
20. See generally JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 148-49 (1977)
(discussing the English doctrine of "standing jurors aside").
21. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17.
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power of the state. Blackstone characterized the peremptory challenge
as "a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for
which our English laws are justly famous."22 This statement, together
with the Ordinance for Inquests, implies that peremptory challenges
were intended to be a buffer between the defendant and the state.
American colonial courts accepted the English courts' procedure
that allowed defendants to exercise peremptory challenges and prose-
cutors to ask jurors to stand aside. After the American Revolution the
states gave defendants a statutory right to peremptorily challenge ju-
rors and accepted as part of the received common law the prosecutor's
right to request jurors to stand aside.
23
In 1790 Congress passed legislation that gave defendants in federal
courts the right to peremptory challenges.24 Subsequently, controversy
arose concerning whether prosecutors in federal courts also had the
right to ask jurors to stand aside.2 5 In 1827 Supreme Court Justice Jo-
seph Story stated in dictum that the stand-aside rule had been
"recognised down to the present times. '26 Nevertheless, in 1856 the
Court held that federal courts were not required to recognize "standing
aside" and should follow the rule applied in the state in which they
sat.
2 7
Gradually, the states began to authorize prosecutorial peremptory
challenges by statute.2 8 Many states, however, allowed the prosecutor
fewer challenges than those granted to the defendant.2 9 This restriction
on the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was an apparent ef-
fort by the states to favor defendants. Once again, this gives rise to the
inference that the intended use of peremptory challenges was as a
buffer between the defendant and the power of the state.
As the states began to pass statutes that permitted the use of pe-
remptory challenges by prosecutors, they also extended the use of pe-
remptory challenges to civil litigation.2 0 Currently, all fifty states pro-
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1965), overruled in part by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 148 (stat-
ing that in early state court decisions the 1305 statute that allowed defendants to chal-
lenge was accepted, but the prosecution's right to challenge aroused more opposition and
was less widely recognized).
24. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119.
25. See VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 149.
26. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483 (1827).
27. United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588, 590 (1856).
28. See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 148-49 (discussing some of the
states).
29. For a state-by-state comparison of the number of peremptory challenges al-
lowed to opposing parties, see WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION 315-36 (1980).
30. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 217 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v.
[Vol. 43
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vide for peremptory challenges in civil trials.31
The use of peremptory challenges in civil litigation is not as deeply
rooted as the use of peremptory challenges in criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, as long as peremptory challenges are allowed in civil tri-
als, their exercise need not be restricted in the same manner as in
criminal trials because the parties do not need protection from the
power of the state. Furthermore, the parties in civil trials are more
evenly matched than the parties in criminal trials. Neither needs pro-
tection from the established power of the other. The purpose for pe-
remptory challenges in civil proceedings is simply to obtain a jury that
is likely to view one's position favorably and to avoid a jury that may
be biased toward the other side. Therefore, it is more appropriate to
restrict the use of peremptory challenges by the state in criminal trials
than it is to restrict the use of peremptory challenges by private liti-
gants in civil trials.
III. LIMITATIONS ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Courts have used two principal theories to limit the use of pe-
remptory challenges by an individual litigant. First, courts have stated
that juries will be impartial only if the petit jury, as well as the jury
venire, is composed of a representative cross-section of the community.
Second, by employing an equal protection analysis, courts have pre-
cluded the use of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
31. ALA. R. Civ. P. 47(b); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 47(d); ARIz. R. Civ. P. 47(a)(3); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-33-203 (Michie 1987); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231 (West Supp. 1991);
COLO. R. Civ. P. 47(h); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-241 (West 1985); DEL. SUPER. CT. CIv.
R. 47(b); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-125 (Michie 1990); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 635-29(b) (1988); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 47(j); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1106
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); INn. CODE ANN. § 34-1-20.5-3 (Burns 1986); IOWA R. Civ. P.
187(g); KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-247(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990); Ky. R. Civ. P. 47.03;
LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1764 (West 1990); ME. R. Civ. P. 47(c); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-
512(h); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 29 (West 1986); MicH. CT. R. 2.511(E); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 546.10 (West 1988); Miss. R. Civ. P. 47(c); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.480 (Vernon
Supp. 1991); MONT. R. Civ. P. 47(b); Nebraska, permitted by local court rules (see JOR-
DAN, supra note 29, at 327); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.040 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 519:19 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:78-7(a) (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-5-14 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 4109 (Consol. Supp. 1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 9-19 (1991); N.D. R. Civ. P. 47(b); OHIO R. Civ. P. 47(B); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 573 (West 1988); OR R. CIv. P. 57D.(2); PA. R. CIv. P. 221; R.L GEN. LAWS § 9-10-
18 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1050 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 15-14-7 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-3-105 (1980); TEx. R. Civ. P. 233; UTAH R.
Civ. P. 47(e); VT. R. Civ. P. 47(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359(B) (Michie Supp. 1991);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.130 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 (1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 805.08(3) (West Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 1-11-202 (1988).
1992]
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manner.
A. Representative Cross-Section Limitation
The Supreme Court recently held in Holland v. Illinois32 that the
Sixth Amendment requirement that a jury venire must be composed of
a representative cross-section of the community cannot be extended to
the petit jury.3 3 Consequently, the Sixth Amendment cannot operate to
restrict the exercise of peremptory challenges in the formation of a
petit jury.34 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, specifically stated
32. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
33. Id. at 481. Specifically, the Court stated:
Our relatively recent cases, beginning with Taylor v. Louisiana, hold that
a fair-cross-section venire requirement is imposed by the Sixth Amendment,
which provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ." The
fair-cross-section venire requirement is obviously not explicit in this text, but
is derived from the traditional understanding of how an "impartial jury" is
assembled. That traditional understanding includes a representative venire, so
that the jury will be, as we have said, "drawn from a fair cross section of the
community." But it has never included the notion that, in the process of draw-
ing the jury, that initial representativeness cannot be diminished by allowing
both the accused and the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined
against their interests ..
Id. at 480 (citations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (i975)).
34. Id. at 481. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Holland, some federal
courts had extended the Sixth Amendment representative cross-section requirement to
the petit jury. See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and
remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). The McCray court acknowledged that the Sixth
Amendment does not confer on the defendant a constitutional right to a petit jury that
actually reflects the composition of the community. Id. at 1128 (citing Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). However, that court further stated: "We thus agree that
the Sixth Amendment does not require any action to ensure that the representative
character of the venire be carried over to the petit jury; we think the Amendment simply
prohibits the state's systematic elimination of the possibility of such a carry-over." Id. at
1129.
The McCray court's reasoning is no longer constitutionally persuasive in light of
Holland. However, the court derived much of that reasoning from state court opinions
interpreting state constitutions. Therefore, the extension of the representative cross-sec-
tion requirement to petit juries must still be considered a valid restriction on the use of
peremptory challenges in some states. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal.
1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499
(Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App.
1980), modified sub nom. State v. Sandoval, 736 P.2d 501 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
At least three jurisdictions have employed the representative cross-section analysis
to limit peremptory challenges by parties in civil trials pursuant to provisions in their
state constitutions that are similar to the Sixth Amendment. See Holley v. J & S Sweep-
ing Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Ct. App. 1983); Williams v. Coppola, 549 A.2d 1092 (Conn.
[Vol. 43
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that "[a] prohibition upon the exclusion of cognizable groups through
peremptory challenges has no conceivable basis in the text of the Sixth
Amendment.
3 5
Because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil trials, this
reasoning is merely instructive. However, if the Supreme Court has de-
clined to allow the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury to re-
strict peremptory challenges, it is unlikely to find that the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial can operate to restrict peremptory
challenges in the civil context. Accordingly, it is appropriate to focus
on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the limi-
tations it places on peremptory challenges.
B. Equal Protection Limitation
In 1880 the Supreme Court held in Strauder v. West Virginia3 6
that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause whenever it acts to
prevent black persons from serving on a jury. The statute at issue in
Strauder stated specifically that "'[a]ll white male persons who are
twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be lia-
ble to serve as jurors.' ",37 From this language the Court concluded that
"the statute of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors,
as it does, against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of
the equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put upon
trial for an alleged offence against the State.
'38
The Supreme Court first indicated that the Equal Protection
Clause could limit the exercise of peremptory challenges in the 1965
case of Swain v. Alabama.9 In Swain the defendant claimed on appeal
that the state's prosecutor violated the equal protection principle of
Strauder when he used his peremptory strikes to remove all six black
persons who remained on the jury venire. Justice White, writing for the
majority, acknowledged that "a State's purposeful or deliberate denial
to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the adminis-
Super. Ct. 1986); City of Miami v. Cornett, 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
For an exhaustive analysis of the representative cross-section requirement for an
impartial jury as a limitation on peremptory challenges, see Timothy Patton, The Dis-
criminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges in Civil Litigation: Practice, Procedure and
Review, 19 TEx. TECH L. REV. 921, 930-43 (1988).
35. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478.
36. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
37. Id. at 305 (quoting 1872-73 W. Va. Acts 102).
38. Id. at 310.
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tration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause."40 After a com-
prehensive review of the history and purpose of peremptory challenges,
the Court concluded, however, that "we cannot hold that the Constitu-
tion requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exer-
cise of his challenges in any given case."
'42
The Court based this determination in part on the presumption
that "the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and
impartial jury to try the case before the court."42 Despite this pre-
sumption, the Court clearly stated that discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges could violate the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically,
the Court stated that "when the prosecutor in a county, in case after
case, whatever the circumstances. . . is responsible for the removal of
Negroes . . . with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries,
the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added significance.
'43
The Swain Court acknowledged that the* Equal Protection Clause
may restrict the use of peremptory challenges. The Court established a
formidable burden of proof, however, by holding that "the defendant
must, to pose the issue, show the prosecutor's systematic use of pe-
remptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time."
44
The rule announced in Swain governed prosecutors' use of pe-
remptory challenges for over twenty years. In 1986 the Supreme Court
considered Batson v. Kentucky." According to the Court, the case re-
quired it "to reexamine that portion of Swain v. Alabama concerning
the evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that
he has been denied equal protection through the State's use of pe-
remptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit
jury."
'"4
In Batson the Court compared the discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges with the elements necessary to establish a prima facie
equal protection violation in the selection of a jury venire. The major-
ity relied on cases decided after Swain which "recognized that a de-
fendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimi-
nation in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts
concerning its selection in his case. '47 Based on these precedents the
40. Id. at 203-04 (citing Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)).
41. Id. at 222.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 223 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
44. Id. at 227.
45. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
46. Id. at 82 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 95 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972)).
[Vol. 43
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss3/7
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Court concluded that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evi-
dence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at
the defendant's trial.
'48
By drawing this analogy the Court essentially eliminated the
Swain presumption that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
had no discriminatory motive. In practical effect, the Court established
the opposite presumption in Batson by allowing a defendant "to rely
on the fact . . . that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate.' ,49
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF BATSON TO Civm TRIALS
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, courts
have struggled with the question of its applicability to civil trials. At
least one federal court has declined to apply Batson to a civil trial
based on the inherent distinctions between criminal and civil trials.50
The judge attached significance to the fact that a criminal defendant is
"haled into court against his will"51 and observed that the Batson
Court had placed emphasis on the "plight of the accused criminal.
'52
After pointing out these distinctions, the judge stated that "[flor these
two reasons alone, I conclude that Batson is not controlling here.15 3
Although the distinctions between civil and criminal trials reveal
strong policy considerations for treating the two situations differently,
they are not dispositive for determining the applicability of Batson's
equal protection rule to civil trials. By its very language the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts only discrimina-
tion to which the state is a party.54 As the Eighth Circuit Court of
48. Id. at 96.
49. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
50. Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986). The court's comments
concerning the application of Batson are dictum because the judge decided the case by
finding that the complaining party had failed to make out a prima facie violation of
purposeful discrimination. See id. at 761.
51. Id. at 761.
52. Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 ("The petit jury has occupied a central posi-
tion in our system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime against the arbi-
trary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge.")).
53. Id.
54. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Equal protection analysis ap-
plies to the federal government by operation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
1992]
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Appeals pointed out, "The more natural reading of Batson is that its
rule of non-discrimination applies only to governmental actors, without
distinguishing criminal and civil legal proceedings."55 Accordingly, the
critical issue is whether sufficient state action exists in a civil trial to
allow for operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because state ac-
tion is a prerequisite to the application of Batson's equal protection
rule, it is useful to distinguish civil trials in which the state or a politi-
cal subdivision is a party from civil trials in which the state is not a
party.
A. Civil Litigation in Which the State is a Party
The presence of state action in the discriminatory exercise of pe-
remptory challenges is easily found whenthe state is a party to a civil
trial. When a governmental entity is party to a civil trial, its case is
presented by a government attorney who is as much a state actor as a
prosecutor in a criminal trial.
At least one United States circuit court and one district court have
specifically addressed the application of Batson to civil trials in which
the state is a party." In Reynolds v. City of Little Rock,57 while specifi-
cally declining to decide whether Batson applies to civil trials in which
the state is not a party,5 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that a city attorney who exercised peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner was a governmental actor.5 9 This ruling allowed
scrutiny of the attorney's actions under the Batson rule.
Reynolds arose out of a confrontation during which members of
the Little Rock Police Department shot and killed John Reeves as he
advanced toward an officer. Reynolds, the administratrix of Reeves's
estate, sued the city under 42 U.S.C. § 198360 and alleged that the po-
55. Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 1990).
56. See id.; Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986) (mem.).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has dealt indirectly with this issue in an unreported
decision. Boykin v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., No. 87-4025 (6th Cir. 1989) (WL,
CTA 6 database). Boykin involved a civil rights suit against a county school board, which
is a governmental entity. Although the court did not specifically hold that the discrimi-
natory peremptory challenges exercised by the school board's attorney constituted state
action, the parties stipulated at trial that Batson applied to the board's attorney. Ac-
cordingly, the court decided that it need not consider "whether as a general principle
Batson applies to all civil cases." Id. at *5:.
57. 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990).
58. Id. at 1008 n.2. The court specifically stated, "We express no view on whether
the action of the court alone, in a case involving no governmental litigants, can supply
the necessary element of governmental action." Id.
59. Id. at 1008-09.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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lice officers had used excessive force and that the city had failed to
enforce adequate standards to control the use of deadly fQrce by the
police. During jury selection the city attorney used peremptory chal-
lenges to remove the two black persons who remained on the jury ve-
nire.6 1 When Reynolds's counsel objected, the city attorney asserted
that "the City was under no obligation to justify its exercise of pe-
remptory strikes in a civil case."'82 The court rejected this assertion and
reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment does not distinguish be-
tween civil and criminal cases.
6 3
The court concluded that the controlling distinction in the appli-
cation of Batson is the distinction "between governmental actors and
private actors. 's4 The court reasoned that the Batson Court's failure to
apply its ruling to defense counsel in a criminal proceeding supported
the conclusion that the distinction between private actors and state
actors is the significant one rather than the distinction between crimi-
nal trials and civil trials. The court stated that the equal protection
principle "does not evaporate when a government lawyer represents his
client in a civil suit. '8 5 Finally, the Reynolds court rejected the city's
argument that the actions of the government attorney became private
simply because the police officers had been sued in both their individ-
ual and official capacities."
In Clark v. City of Bridgeport7 the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut reached the same conclusion as the
Reynolds court. Clark dealt with consolidated civil rights suits against
the city. The Clark court held that the city attorney's use of peremp-
tory challenges to prevent all of the black persons in the venire from
serving on the petit jury violated the Equal Protection Clause.' The
court noted that criminal defendants make most of the challenges to
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Nevertheless, it ruled
that this did "not foreclose the application of Batson and the constitu-
tional mandate for equal protection in civil cases where, as here, there
is state action involved in the exercise of peremptory challenges." ' 9
The Clark court failed, however, to define clearly that it was not
expressing an opinion on the applicability of Batson to civil trials in
61. Reynolds, 893 F.2d at 1006.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1008.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1008-09.
66. Id. at 1009 ("The City cannot exempt itself from the Equal Protection Clause
simply because its counsel also represents individuals.").
67. 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986) (mem.).
68. Id. at 891.
69. Id. at 895.
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which the state is not a party. The Clark court noted that one other
court ° had found Swain v. Alabama71 "'applicable to both criminal
and civil cases, regardless of whether the peremptory challenge is made
by a governmental entity or a private party.' ,,72 The Clark court there-
fore implied that Batson could apply to private parties in civil trials.
Regardless of whether the Clark court intended such an implication, it
concluded that "there simply is no reason why the equal protection
analysis now employed in Batson should not apply with equal force to
the instant case."7'3 Based on Reynolds v. City of Little Rock and Clark
v. City of Bridgeport, it seems certain that when a state or political
subdivision is a party to a civil trial, the actions of the state's attorney
will constitute state action.
B. Civil Litigation in Which the State is Not a Party
The presence of state action in the discriminatory exercise of pe-
remptory challenges is more difficult to establish when the state is not
a party to a civil trial. This is demonstrated by the disagreement
among the United States Courts of Appeals that have directly ruled on
the issue74 and by Justice O'Connor's strong dissent from the majority
opinion in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
75
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.76 the Supreme Court established a
two-part analysis for determining whether an action is "fairly attribu-
table to the State."77 First, the act or deprivation complained of, in-
cluding the denial of equal protection, "must be caused by the exercise
of some right or privilege created by the State."7 s Second, the act must
be performed by "a person who may fairly be said to be a state ac-
70. King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (mem.).
71. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
72. Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 895 (quoting King, 581 F. Supp. at 499-500). The King
court made this statement despite its earlier finding that "it is much easier to argue that
a peremptory challenge made by a governmental entity constitutes governmental action
than it is to argue that a peremptory challenge made by a private party and merely
accepted by a court constitutes governmental action." King, 581 F. Supp. at 499.
73. Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 895.
74. Compare Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
bane), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) with Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919
F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991); Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d
822 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
75. See 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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tor." 9 The distinction between these two principles is less apparent
when the discriminatory actor is a state official than when the discrimi-
natory actor is a private party."0
Before a court can find the presence of state action in a civil trial,
both parts of the Lugar test must be met. The peremptory challenge is
clearly a right created by the state."1 Civil trials theoretically present
two possible state actors. First, the trial judge, as a state official, may
qualify as a discriminatory state actor. Second, the private attorney,
acting jointly with the trial judge, may qualify as a discriminatory state
actor.
1. The Trial Judge as Discriminatory State Actor
Initially, an action by the trial judge seems to satisfy both parts of
the Lugar analysis. The state creates by statutory enactment the right
to peremptory challenges, and the trial judge is a state official. The
critical question is, however, whether the judge engages in any discrim-
inatory conduct.
In Fludd v. Dykes8 2 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that "[iun overruling the objection, which informed the court that the
peremptory challenger may be excluding blacks from the venire on ac-
count of their race, the judge becomes guilty of the sort of discrimina-
tory conduct that the equal protection clause proscribes. ' 's 3 The court
arrived at this conclusion by reference to Strauder v. West Virginia,14
Virginia v. Rives,8 5 and Neal v. Delaware.8 From these cases the court
determined that "the Supreme Court has long recognized that the dis-
criminatory actor is the trial court. ' '8 7
A closer examination reveals that in each of these cases the state
committed some predicate act that violated the Equal Protection
79. Id.
80. Id. As the Supreme Court explained, these two principles "collapse into each
other when the claim of a constitutional deprivation is directed against a party whose
official character is such as to lend the weight of the State to his decisions." Id.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
82. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
83. Id. at 828. Interestingly, the Fludd court should never have reached the ques-
tion of whether the Batson rule applies to private civil litigants. The peremptory chal-
lenges at issue in the case were exercised by the county attorney in his official capacity.
Telephone interview with Robert C. Daniel, County Attorney for Richmond County,
Georgia (Oct. 30, 1990). The county attorney's status as a government lawyer qualified
him as a state actor.
84. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 825 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
85. Id. at 828 (citing Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880)).
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Clause and that the error committed by the trial court was its failure
to redress a pre-existing equal protection violation. This situation is
distinguishable from that in which a private party exercises a peremp-
tory challenge in a discriminatory manner and the judge simply over-
rules an objection to the challenge. This type of peremptory challenge
is a private act that the court cannot redress because, as an entirely
private act, it does not violate the Fourteenth Amendmient.
Strauder v. West Virginia88 arose out of a criminal prosecution in
which a black defendant had been tried by a jury composed entirely of
white males as required by a West Virginia statute.89 The defendant
petitioned for removal of his case to the federal court and also moved
to quash the venire because the state had denied his constitutional
right to equal protection by excluding black persons from jury ser-
vice.°0 The state trial court denied all of the defendant's motions.,'
From these facts the Supreme Court determined that the West
Virginia statute "amount[ed] to a denial of the equal protection of the
laws to a colored man when he is put upon trial for an alleged offence
against the State. ' 92 Accordingly, the state action that violated the
Equal Protection Clause was the legislative enactment of the discrimi-
natory statute. The Supreme Court held that the state court erred
when it overruled the defendant's challenge of the state act because
that act already had violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion rights.13 The Court did not hold that the state court's ruling itself
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
In Virginia v. Rives94 two black men were indicted by, and tried
before, juries made up entirely of white males, despite a Virginia stat-
ute that allowed black males to serve as jurors.9 5 The defendants peti-
tioned under a civil rights removal statute for removal of their case to
a federal court and alleged that the state officer responsible for assem-
bling their juries failed to select any black men because of their race.98
The Court ruled that if the allegations in the complaint were proved,
"[the officer's] act was the act of the State, and was prohibited by the
Constitutional [Fourteenth] [A]mendment. '97 The removal statute
that the Rives defendants attempted to use provided for removal
88. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
89. Id. at 305.
90. Id. at 304-05.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 310.
93. Id.
94. 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
95. Id. at 315.
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"'when any . . . prosecution is commenced in any State court ...
against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the judicial
tribunals of the State. .. any right secured to him by any law provid-
ing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States.' "98 The
Court found that this statute did not apply to the defendants.9 9 Be-
cause the state officer who had allegedly denied the defendant's civil
rights violated a state law, the Court reasoned that "it can hardly be
said that [the defendant] is denied, or cannot enforce, 'in the judicial
tribunals of the State' the rights which belong to him."100 The Court
based this conclusion on the presumption that the state court would
redress the previous denial of equal protection. 0 1
Although the Court stated that "[i]f the accused is deprived of the
right, the final and practical denial will be in the judicial tribunal
which tries the case,' 1 2 it did not hold that the trial judge was the
discriminatory actor. The state officer already had violated the Equal
Protection Clause while selecting the jurors. Therefore, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the state court's failure to redress the pre-existing
equal protection violation would result in the ultimate denial of the
right.1
0 3
Neal v. Delaware0 involved circumstances similar to those in
Rives. State officers responsible for selecting jurors violated the Equal
Protection Clause by excluding all black persons from the jury.0 5 Be-
cause "[t]he action of those officers . . . is to be deemed the act of the
State," 06 the Supreme Court ruled that "the refusal of the State court
to redress the wrong by them committed was a denial of a right se-
cured to the prisoner by the Constitution.'.
0 7
These cases stand for the proposition that when a state official
acts in a discriminatory manner and violates the Equal Protection
Clause, it is error for the trial court not to redress that violation. If the
state does not perform the discriminatory act, however, no equal pro-
98. Id. at 317 (quoting Revised Statutes of the United States, Title XIII, ch. 7,
§ 641 (1873-74)).
99. Id. at 321-23.
100. Id. at 321.
101. Id. at 321-22.
102. Id. at 322.
103. Id.
104. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
105. Id. at 397. The Court made it clear that the underlying equal protection viola-
tion originated with those officials. "The showing thus made ... that no colored citizen
had ever been summoned as a juror in the courts of the State ... presented a prima
facie case of denial, by the officers charged with the selection of grand and petit jurors,
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tection violation exists for the court to redress.
Those who favor the extension of Batson's holding to private civil
litigants assert that the trial judge's direction to a prospective juror
that the juror should step down is sufficient state action to find an
equal protection violation. However, this assertion still does not iden-
tify the source of the impermissible discriminatory decision. The trial
judge does not decide to discriminate when the judge directs the pro-
spective -juror to step down. Rather, the judge simply decides to carry
out functions allocated to judges under the statute. The private party
has made the discriminatory decision; that decision is constitutionally
permissible.
A private party litigant in a civil trial does not violate any law
when that litigant challenges black jurors simply because they are
black. Accordingly, it is improper to say that the trial court is the dis-
criminatory actor. The court does not facilitate the denial of a right
when that denial does not violate any law. If the trial judge's action is
to be considered impermissible, it must be considered in conjunction
with the private party's discriminatory decision.
Not only is the court's conclusion in Fludd v. Dykes 08 that "the
Supreme Court has long recognized that the discriminatory actor is the
trial court"10 9 misguided in light of the precedents cited, but that con-
clusion also directly contradicts statements of the Supreme Court.
First, in Swain v. Alabama'10 the Court observed that "[tihe essential
nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised. . . with-
out being subject to the court's control.""' Although this statement is
simply a factual observation, it nonetheless specifically contradicts the
Fludd court's contention. Furthermore, despite Batson's modification
of Swain's evidentiary standard, the historical and factual observations
in Swain are still valid.
12
Second, in Batson the Supreme Court specifically declined to com-
ment on whether the new rule applied to the defendant's private coun-
sel. 113 This statement is less persuasive, however, because the question
was not specifically before the Court. Nevertheless, if the Supreme
Court truly believed that the trial court was the discriminatory actor in
108. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
109. Id. at 828.
110. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
111. Id. at 220.
112. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
113. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986) ("We express no views on
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the exercise of peremptory challenges, it could have announced such a
rule in Swain or Batson and restricted discriminatory peremptory
challenges. The Court did not announce that rule, however, and left
the clear implication that the prosecutor is the state actor.
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Fludd v. Dykes,"'
the Fifth Circuit determined in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co."'
that the trial judge could not be considered a state actor. The Edmon-
son court determined that "[i]f the judge is the actor, then. . . it fol-
lows that every aspect of every civil trial, state and federal, is constitu-
tionalized."" 6 The court further stated that this would be "a quantum
procedural leap that we leave for the Supreme Court to make, should it
wish to do so." ''
2. The Private Attorney as Discriminatory State Actor
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co."" the Supreme Court stated that
determining whether state involvement with private discriminatory
conduct transforms the private conduct into state action is a question
of fact.1 9 When a private party acts in a discriminatory manner pursu-
ant to a right or privilege created by the state, "something more"'
2
must exist for that conduct to constitute state action. The Lugar Court
identified four tests that have been used to determine whether this
"something more" is present.121
Of the four tests, the joint action test and the state compulsion
test could plausibly be used to characterize a private litigant's peremp-
tory challenges as state action. The other two tests do not logically
apply to a peremptory challenge situation." 2 Unfortunately, Justice
114. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
115. 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
116. Id. at 222.
117. Id. In reversing the Edmonson decision, the Supreme Court failed to take this
leap in the manner described by the Fifth Circuit. Instead, the Court used a combination
of several state action tests to find that the private party was a state actor. See Edmon-
son, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-87.
118. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
119. See id. at 939.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Court identified these as the public function test (citing Terry v. Ad-
ams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)), the state compulsion
test (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)), the nexus test (citing
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)), and the joint action test (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149 (1978)). Id. The Court did not determine whether these tests are "actually
different" or merely "different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact bound in-
quiry." Id.
122. The public function test allows a court to find state action when a private party
19921
17
Hammond: Peremptory Challenges: Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. and the
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Kennedy's majority opinion in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 123
misstated Supreme Court precedent and erroneously applied the pub-
lic function test to a private party's peremptory challenges."' Justice
Kennedy also applied a form of the joint action test, which is more
appropriate in analyzing peremptory challenges. However, as discussed
below, neither the joint action test nor the state compulsion test re-
quire a court to characterize a private litigant's peremptory challenges
as state action.
a. The Joint Action Test
The joint action test allows a court to find state action when a
private party and a governmental entity act together to violate the
Equal Protection Clause."25 In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.'2" a
majority of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the trial
court's involvement in a private party's peremptory challenges as a
"merely ministerial function. 11 7 The court reasoned that "simply per-
mitting the venire members cut by counsel to depart is an action so
minimal in nature that one of less significance can scarcely be
imagined." 812s To support this conclusion the court cited Blum v.
Yaretsky,"29 in which the Supreme Court said that "a State normally
can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exer-
cised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement
...that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.""30
performs an act traditionally performed by a governmental entity, Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953) (administering a primary election), or provides a service traditionally
provided by a governmental entity, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (administer-
ing a municipality). The nexus test allows a court to find state action when a private
party is closely connected with a governmental entity. Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (involving a lease for space in a government-owned and gov-
ernment-operated parking facility).
123. 111 S. Ct 2077 (1991).
124. Id. at 2092-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy used a two-step
analysis in his opinion. First, he applied an implied form of the state action test to deter-
mine that private parties accomplish peremptory challenges with "'the overt, significant
assistance'of state officials.'" Id. at 2084 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Servs.,
Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988)). Second, he determined that peremptory chal-
lenge3 are a traditional government function. Id. at 2085.
125. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (finding that because
the state had not acted jointly with the private party who acquired a lien pursuant to
state law, there was no state action).
126. 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), revud, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
127. Id. at 221.
128. Id.
129. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
130. Id. at 1004 (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson
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The Yaretsky Court further stated that "[m]ere approval of or ac-
quiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to jus-
tify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment."''1 1 This statement is particularly in-
structive because Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,3" which the Lugar Court
cited as approving the joint action test,"33 also stated that "[t]his Court
. ..has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a private action
converts that action into that of the State.""'
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit majority's characterization of pe-
remptory challenges, the dissent in Edmonson argued that "the private
litigant employing peremptory challenges on the basis of race has 'ac-
ted together with or obtained significant aid from state officials' in a
manner sufficient to meet the second part of the Lugar test."
1 35
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed the joint action
analysis in Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc."36 and relied on
Shelley v. Kraemer"37 to find that Batson applied to private civil liti-
gants. This is curious because Shelley is most often cited as an exam-
ple of the state compulsion test.18 A majority of the Seventh Circuit
panel decided that the trial judge "exercises his authority to excuse the
juror" 1 9 and thus assists the private party's discrimination. The dis-
senting judge disagreed and stated that "the acquiescence of a judge
when private litigants exercise peremptory challenges is fundamentally
different from the state action established in Shelley."I 0
Although the question is not easily resolved, the analysis of the
Fifth Circuit majority in Edmonson more accurately describes the pro-
cedure by which peremptory challenges are carried out. The party who
exercises the challenge makes the decision to discriminate. The trial
court takes no part in the discriminatory decision; rather the judge
simply excuses the juror. This situation seems to fall squarely within
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)).
131. Id. at 1004-05. (citing Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164-65; Jackson, 419 U.S. at
353).
132. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
133. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 927 n.6 (1982).
134. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164.
135. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 233 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
136. 919 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991).
137. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
138. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
139. Dunham, 919 F.2d at 1286.
140. Id. at 1298.
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the Blum v. Yaretsky141 standard. The trial court merely acquiesces in
the decision of the private party and does not transform the private
litigant's decision into state action.
b. The State Compulsion Test
The state compulsion test allows a court to find state action when
the state compels a private party to discriminate and thereby violates
the Equal Protection Clause.14 2 In Shelley v. Kraemer14 the Supreme
Court held that judicial enforcement of a private restrictive covenant
can constitute state action. 144 Shelley is most accurately identified as
an example of the state compulsion test.1 45 Despite the historical and
precedential importance of Shelley, neither Fludd nor the Fifth Cir-
cuit's Edmonson opinion discussed the decision. Shelley involved a
suit to enforce a restrictive covenant. The Shelleys, a black couple,
bought a piece of property that was subject to a restrictive covenant
intended to prevent sale of the property to black persons.1"4 The
Kraemers, who owned an adjacent parcel of land, sued to enforce the
covenant. They asked the court to prevent the Shelleys from taking
possession of the property and to divest the Shelleys of title." 7 The
Shelleys won at trial, but on appeal the Missouri Supreme Court ruled
for the Kraemers and ordered the trial court to expel the Shelleys from
the property and to divest them of title.
1 48
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court first re-
emphasized that judicial action can qualify as state action for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes 149 and then held that the trial court's
eviction order constituted state action and violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.15 0 The Court noted that both parties to the transaction
had willingly entered into the contract of sale and that "but for the
active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of
state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties
in question without restraint."1'" In practical effect, the state court had
141. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
142. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170-71 (1970).
143. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
144. Id. at 20.
145. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.3, at 433 (3d ed. 1986) [here-
inafter NOWAK].
146. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4-5.
147. Id. at 6.
148, Id. The Shelleys were living on the property at the time of the Missouri Su-
preme Court's decision. Id.
149. Id. at 14-15.
150. Id. at 20.
151. Id. at 19.
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compelled the sellers of the property to discriminate against the Shel-
leys because the Shelleys were black. This state compulsion of a dis-
criminatory decision violated the Equal Protection Clause.152 The
Court also emphasized that the state court had not "merely abstained
from action,' ' 153 but instead had "made available . . . the full coercive
power of government to deny. . . the enjoyment of property rights.'
1 54
Although Shelley presents facts more closely analogous to the ex-
ercise of peremptory challenges by private litigants than the cases re-
lied on by the Fludd v. Dykes' court,156 Shelley is distinguishable
from the exercise of peremptory challenges by private litigants. During
the exercise of peremptory challenges, a court never instructs or com-
pels the private litigant to make a discriminatory decision. The private
litigant alone chooses to challenge the prospective jurors. 57 Addition-
ally, the language of Shelley distinguishes the case from private liti-
gant peremptory challenges. In Shelley the Supreme Court specifically
condemned the trial court's "active intervention" and the fact that it
used "the full coercive power of government" to expel the Shelleys
from their home. 58
Consequently, the state compulsion test, like the joint action test,
requires a court to determine whether the trial court has exercised "co-
ercive power"'' 5  or simply expressed "[m]ere approval of or acquies-
cence in"' 60 the private discriminatory act. Shelley should not be read,
however, to require a court to find that private litigant peremptory
challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause. During the exercise of
peremptory challenges, the trial court neither compels a private dis-
criminatory decision, actively intervenes in that decision, nor exercises
coercive power. Rather, as indicated above, the court simply acquiesces
in the private litigant's decision.
152. See NOWAK, supra note 145, at 433-34. "[Tihe state court order would be a
judicial command to the current owner ... to make a racial distinction in the sale of
property. Such a command, interfering with a willing seller and a willing buyer, violates
the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment." Id.; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111
S. Ct. 2077, 2090-91 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
154. Id.
155. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
156. See supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
157. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2091 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
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3. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.116 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits private litigants in civil cases from exercising
peremptory challenges to discriminate in federal court proceedings.
The Court acknowledged that racial discrimination "violates the Con-
stitution only when it may be attributed to state action."'6 2 It also ac-
knowledged that, in addition to being a constitutional requirement, the
state action doctrine "'preserves an area of individual freedom by lim-
iting the reach of federal law' and 'avoids imposing on the State...
responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.' ,,163
Nevertheless, the Court employed two of the tests identified in Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co.' 64 to find state action when a private party's
lawyer makes a private decision to exercise a peremptory challenge
against a member of a racial minority in a civil trial.
First, without identifying it, the Court employed a form of the
joint action test to find that "a private party could not exercise its
peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the
court."165 Second, the Court employed the public function test to find
that peremptory challenges involve a traditional function of the
government.1 66
To arrive at the conclusion that private peremptory challenges are
exercised with the "overt, significant assistance of the court,'1 67 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, relied almost exclusively on Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope"" and did not mention
the Blum v. Yaretsky' 6 standard established six years prior to Pope.
In Pope the creditors of an estate claimed that the state had denied
them due process of law. The creditors argued that the statute pro-
vided an unreasonably short time within which they had to make a
claim against the estate after having received notice to file their claims.
The Pope Court considered whether the state's notification proce-
dure constituted state action, thereby triggering the due process guar-
antees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 0 The Court found that
161. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
162. Id. at 2082 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
163. Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982)).
164. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
165. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084.
166. Id. at 2085.
167. Id. at 2084.
168. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
169. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
170. Pope, 485 U.S. at 486-87.
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Oklahoma's notification statute involved state action because it was
not self-executing. In fact, the statute directed the executrix to publish
notice, and the Court reinforced that direction with an "order ex-
pressly requiring appellee to 'immediately give notice to creditors.' ,,1
The Court characterized this as "overt, significant assistance of state
officials" that qualified as state action. The Edmonson Court relied on
this language to support its finding that private party peremptory chal-
lenges qualify as state action. However, a statutory mandate to per-
form an act, reinforced by a court order, is distinguishable from a pri-
vate party's personal decision to exercise a peremptory challenge.
17 2
In addition to relying on Pope, the majority also relied on its own
analysis of peremptory challenges to find that they are exercised with
the overt and significant assistance of the court. The majority pointed
out that the government establishes juror qualifications, summons ju-
rors at random from a fair cross-section of the community, defines the
jury wheel and voter lists, and requires jurors to complete qualification
forms. 7 3 The majority also pointed out that trial courts can exercise
extensive control over voir dire.174 None of these actions, however, as-
sist the private party litigant in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
A trial court simply assembles the pool of individuals against whom
the private litigant may decide to direct those challenges.
7 5
Finally, the majority stated that "[w]hen a lawyer exercises a pe-
remptory challenge, the judge advises the juror he or she has been ex-
cused."'17 In reality, this is the full extent of the judge's involvement
with the private litigant's discriminatory decision. Unfortunately, the
majority failed to consider the Blum v. Yaretsky 7 7 standard to deter-
mine whether the judge's act of excusing the juror qualifies as the exer-
cise of "coercive power '' 7RT or is "[mI]ere approval of or acquiescence
in 11 9 the act of a private party. Significantly, the dissenters did con-
sider Yaretsky and concluded that "[tihe judge does little more than
171. Id. at 487 (quoting trial record).
172. It is significant that the author of the Pope opinion, Justice O'Connor, strongly
disagreed with Justice Kennedy's characterization of Pope in Edmonson. See Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2091 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2084.
174. Id.
175. As Justice O'Connor explained: "Most of [the majority's] evidence is irrelevant
to the issue at hand.. . . All of this activity, as well as the trial judge's control over voir
dire, are merely prerequisites to the use of a peremptory challenge; they do not consti-
tute participation in the challenge." Id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
176. Id. at 2084.
177. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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acquiesce in [the] decision by excusing the juror.''is°
The Edmonson majority also held that a private litigant's exercise
of a peremptory challenge qualifies as state action because it "involves
the performance of a traditional function of the government."181 How-
ever, even if the formation of a qualified jury is a traditional govern-
ment function, it does not necessarily follow that a peremptory chal-
lenge directed against an otherwise qualified juror is a traditional
government function.1 12 In fact, as this Note's historical overview of
peremptory challenges explains, one of the original purposes behind
peremptory challenges was to protect criminal defendants from the
power of government. 183 Although peremptory challenges in civil trials
serve a different function, they do not necessarily serve a governmental
function. The government's primary interest is to seat a qualified jury,
but a litigant's primary interest is to seat a jury favorable to that liti-
gant's position, or at least one that is not biased toward the opposing
party's position. In this setting the peremptory challenge serves a dis-
tinctly private function.8
Not only did Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Edmonson
misstate the facts surrounding the exercise of peremptory challenges,
but as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent, "the Court has
misstated the law. 1 85 The majority relied on Terry v. Adams8" to sup-
port its position that peremptory challenges are a traditional function
of government.18 7 In Terry the Supreme Court held that elections con-
ducted by a private organization constituted state action because the
organization's candidate was certain to win the local democratic pri-
mary and the democratic candidate was certain to win the general elec-
tion. The only factual similarity the majority established between elec-
tions and peremptory challenges was that "the objective of jury
selection proceedings is to determine representation on a governmental
body." 88 However, the majority failed to recognize that the public
180. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2085.
182. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissenting opinion: "The government
otherwise establishes its requirements for jury service, leaving to the private litigant the
unfettered discretion to use the strike for any reason. This is not part of the govern-
ment's function in establishing the requirements for jury service." Id. at 2092 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
184. "Peremptory challenges are not a traditional government function; the 'tradi-
tion' is one of unguided private choice." Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
185. Id.
186. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
187. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085 (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)).
188. Id. at 2086.
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function doctrine can be used to establish state action only if the tradi-
tional government function engaged in by the private party is one that
is normally carried out exclusively by government.""9 As Justice
O'Connor stated: "Even if one could fairly characterize the use of a
peremptory strike as the performance of the traditional government
function of jury selection, it has never been exclusively the function of
the government to select juries; peremptory strikes are older than the
Republic."'" In sum, Edmonson stretches the state action doctrine to
the breaking point and further confuses an already unclear area of con-
stitutional jurisprudence. 91
V. SECTION 1983 LIABILITY UNDER EDMONSON
In addition to confusing state action jurisprudence, the Edmonson
opinion exposes private attorneys and litigants"' to liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1-- It seems inconceivable that a private attorney who
exercises peremptory challenges in the best interests of a client could
189. Id. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In order to constitute state action
under this doctrine, private conduct must not only comprise something that the govern-
ment traditionally does, but something that only the government traditionally does.")
(citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).
190. Id.
191. See id. at 2096.
192. The Edmonson Court did not distinguish between the acts of the client and the
acts of the private attorney. Therefore, although the Edmonson Court found state action,
it is not clear who the state actor is. The Court used the term "private litigant" through-
out the opinion, but it is unclear whether the Court intended to identify a private attor-
ney's client as a state actor. It is not difficult to imagine a client defending a § 1983 suit
by claiming that the lawyer made all decisions regarding the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges. The client may view jury selection as an issue of strategy that the lawyer has
authority to resolve without the client's input. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1983) ("[T]he lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and
legal tactical issues .... "). To establish liability for a private attorney, however, the
plaintiff would have to prove that the attorney was the actor in relation to the peremp-
tory challenges. The fact that a state licenses an attorney is not sufficient to convert the
acts of the attorney into acts under color of state law. Crawford-El v. Shapiro, 877 F.2d
59 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (text in Westlaw).
193. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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later have to defend a section 1983 suit brought by the opposing party;
yet this is precisely the possibility that the Court has created.
The exposure to section 1983 liability is a direct result of the
Court's misconstruction of the state action doctrine because, as the Su-
preme Court stated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,1 9 4 "[i]f the chal-
lenged conduct. . . constitutes state action. . . then that conduct [is]
also action under color of state law and will support a suit under
§ 1983."''1 Because the Court found state action in a private party's
exercise of peremptory challenges in a civil suit in Edmonson, the
Court also found, perhaps unwittingly, that the exercise of peremptory
challenges is conduct under color of state law.
A private attorney or litigant cannot escape liability under section
1983 by asserting that the constitutional deprivation was, under the
Edmonson analysis, a deprivation of the excluded juror's rights. The
requirements of third-party standing under section 1983 are identical
to those in any other type of suit. 96 The Edmonson Court examined
the Court's reasoning in Powers v. Ohio,'9 7 which held that a defendant
in a criminal case who objects to the prosecution's exercise of peremp-
tory challenges meets the requirements for third-party standing and
therefore can assert the excluded juror's rights.19 The Edmonson
Court analyzed each requirement and found that the reasoning of the
Powers Court applied equally in a civil case. 99 Therefore, a private
attorney or litigant can be liable to the opposing party under section
1983 for the denial of a juror's right.
Although some may view the imposition of section 1983 liability
on private parties to a lawsuit who exercise peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner as a welcome development that will curb pri-
194. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
195. Id. at 935. The Court noted, however, that the converse is not always true.
[A]lthough we hold that conduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory requirement of action under
color of state law, it does not follow from that that all conduct that satisfies the
under-color-of-state-law requirement would satisfy the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requirement of state action.
Id. at 935 n.18.
196. Romano v. Harrington, 664 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (mem.).
[T]he Court examines the relationship between plaintiff and the person whose
right he seeks to assert and determines if (1) the enjoyment of the right is
inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue and if (2)
the litigant is as effective a proponent of the right as the third party. The
Court must also assess the ability of the third party to assert his own right and
if there is "some genuine obstacle to such assertion."
Id. at 681 (citations omitted) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116 (1976)).
197. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss3/7
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
vate discrimination, this result is exactly what the state action doctrine
was intended to prohibit. The Fourteenth Amendment simply does not
reach private conduct. A private litigant's liability for provable dam-
ages under section 1983 for the discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges makes no sense in light of the fact that a prosecutor in a
criminal case, a true state actor, would be protected from liability be-
cause of prosecutorial immunity.s0
Further, now that private litigants are liable under section 1983
for their exercise of peremptory challenges, there is no limit to the
number of other causes of action that creative plaintiffs will develop.
201
Section 1983 is not limited to violations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; rather, it covers the denial of "any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution" or any federal statute.202 The Ed-
monson Court's misconstruction of the law of state action has created
section 1983 liability for conduct to which section 1983 was never
meant to apply and has opened the door for a vast expansion of section
1983's reach into areas that the Edmonson Court could never have
contemplated.
VI. STATE COURT TREATMENT OF THE BATsON RULE
Surprisingly few state courts have addressed the applicability of
Batson to private party litigants. However, this section is included be-
cause a number of state courts of last resort have interpreted their
state constitutions to protect personal liberties to a greater extent than
the federal constitution, and these interpretations provide further
background information about the development of Fourteenth Amend-
200. See Newsome v. Daley, No. 84-C-4996, 1987 WL 9311 (N.D. InI. Apr. 7, 1987)
(mem.).
201. In the recent case of Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare,
780 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (mem.), a sexually abused child tried to sue her
father under § 1983 based on due process grounds and the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5118e (West Supp. 1991). The child asserted that
her father had become a state actor under the Edmonson analysis because he had partic-
ipated in court proceedings. Chrissy F., 780 F. Supp. at 1117. In rejecting the child's
argument, the court stated:
Unlike Edmonson, where a private litigant actively participated in selecting
those individuals who as a jury would ultimately exercise the powers and au-
thority of the court, the facts here suggest only that [the defendant father] was
given his day in court. This Court simply does not read Edmonson as an open-
ing of the section 1983 door against all litigants in state court judicial proceed-
ings merely because of their participation in lawsuits.
Id. However, the court's language leaves little doubt that it would award § 1983 damages
if presented with facts similar to those in Edmonson. See id.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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ment jurisprudence as it applies to peremptory challenges.
The courts of last resort in two states, the New York Court of Ap-
peals 20 3 and Hawaii Supreme Court,204 have interpreted their state con-
stitutions to require private defense counsel in criminal trials to justify
their challenges on nondiscriminatory grounds.2 0 5 The Alabama Su-
preme Court has relied on Fludd v. Dykes and held that the Batson
rule applies to private litigants.2 6
In People v. Kern20 7 the New York Court of Appeals held that the
New York State Constitution prohibits private party litigants from dis-
criminating in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 08 Kern involved
the trial of four white teenagers who attacked three black teenagers in
the Howard Beach section of New York. During the first day of jury
selection, the defendants' private attorney peremptorily challenged
three black persons on the jury venire. The prosecutor objected and
asked the judge to require the defense counselor to justify his chal-
lenges.20 3 The court first denied the Batson motion as premature, then
reserved decision, and ultimately applied Batson prospectively and re-
quired the defense counselor to justify his subsequent challenges. 210 On
appeal the defendants argued that neither the state nor federal consti-
tution restrict peremptory challenges by private party litigants.
21
The Kern court concluded that both the civil rights clause and the
equal protection clause of the New York Constitution prohibit racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges by private litigants.1 2 On the
critical issue of state action, the court relied on Shelley v. Kraemer21 3
203. People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
204. State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990).
205. A longstanding rule of American jurisprudenceprotects the right of state courts
to interpret their state constitutions as they see fit, provided that the interpretation does
not offend the Constitution or laws of the United States. Murdock v. City of Memphis,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). Accordingly, state courts may interpret their state consti-
tutions to afford more protection to individuals than the United States Constitution.
206. Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So. 2d 343, 344-46 (Ala. 1989).
Two other state courts had examined the issue and held that the United States Constitu-
tion did not require the application of Batson to civil litigation. Chavous v. Brown, 396
S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2791 (1991), rev'd per curiam, 409 S.E.2d 356
(S.C. 1991); Powers v. Palacios, 794 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd per curiam,
813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991). In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Edmonson, the
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision, 409 S.E.2d at 356-57, and
the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Texas Court of Appeals, 813 S.W.2d at 490-91.
207. 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
208. Id. at 1236.
209. Id. at 1239.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1240.
212. Id. at 1241.
213. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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and determined that "it is the Judge, with the full coercive authority
of the State, who enforces the discriminatory decision by ordering the
excused juror to leave the courtroom. '214 Of course, this holding does
not affect Shelley's impact on Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
because the Kern court specifically stated that it was interpreting the
New York State Constitution.
In State v. Levinson21 5 the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the
reasoning of Kern and held that the Hawaii Constitution prevents a
private defense attorney from discriminating against women in the ex-
ercise of peremptory challenges. 218 The Hawaii Constitution contains a
civil rights clause similar to New York's.2 17 The Levinson court held
that "the right to serve on a jury is a privilege of citizenship, guaran-
teed by the constitution, and. . . that right cannot be taken away for
any of the prohibited bases of race, religion, sex, or ancestry. '21 ' The
court also followed the reasoning in Kern that "given. .. the fact that
it is the judge who must excuse the juror, the defendant's racially bi-
ased peremptory challenges were converted into State action."21 Ac-
cordingly, the court found that the defense counselor's challenges vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution.
220
In Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc.221 the Alabama Su-
preme Court simply adopted the reasoning of Fludd v. Dykes, without
analysis, and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution requires application of the Batson rule to private
litigants.2 2 The court declined to decide whether discriminatory pe-
remptory challenges exercised by private litigants violate the Alabama
Constitution.
223
This review of state treatment of peremptory challenges by private
litigants indicates that state courts that wish to guarantee the broad
application of the Batson rule have a significant opportunity to do so
through interpretation of their individual state constitutions. These
decisions also provide a means of achieving Edmonson's result without
confusing Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. This opportunity will
arise, however, only if a party who objects to discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges includes a claim that they violate the state constitution.
214. Kern, 554 N.E.2d at 1245.
215. 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990).
216. Id. at 849-50.
217. Id. at 849.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 849-50.
221. 551 So. 2d 343 (Ala. 1989).
222. Id. at 345.
223. Id. at 344.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges by private
litigants cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of
state action. Furthermore, if a court finds that private litigant peremp-
tory challenges constitute state action, it should be through some type
of state compulsion or joint action test that transforms private discrim-
ination into state action. In order for, state action to exist under either
of these tests, a court must find that the trial judge actively intervened
in the discriminatory act and exerted the coercive power of the govern-
ment. The Supreme Court's Edmonson opinion found that private liti-
gants exercise peremptory challenges with the overt and significant as-
sistance of the court and based its holding at least in part on these
facts. However, the better-reasoned view, as expressed in Justice
O'Connor's strongly worded dissent, is that the trial judge merely ac-
quiesces in the private discriminatory decision and performs only a
ministerial function of dismissing the prospective juror; therefore, state
action is not present.
Unfounded discrimination is always reprehensible and this Note is
not intended to justify discrimination in any form. This author be-
lieves that invidious racial discrimination is objectionable regardless of
where it takes place. However, just as putting an end to discrimination
is an effort to protect the personal liberties of those subject to discrimi-
nation, the jurisprudence of state action is an effort to protect the per-
sonal liberties of private individuals to believe and act as they wish.
More importantly, state action is required for operation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the doctrine should not be weakened even in
an effort to accomplish a commendable goal.
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